When talking about an endpoint device, we are talking about an end asset present at the network level. Among these devices we can find engineering stations (workstations), HMI, SCADA or PLC, among others.
The evolution of industrial environments towards models in which these equipment are connected, both with corporate networks and remotely with suppliers, for maintenance purposes, exposes them to new threats. That is why industrial endpoints must be properly and individually protected and at multiple levels so that they cannot be compromised. These end systems are key security hotspots because their vulnerabilities could affect other assets within the network.
Within the industrial world, there are some sectors such as robotics, which has evolver considerably. This has led to the need to update all the regulations and standards, both in terms of physical (safety) and cybersecurity. (security). Given that the robotics sector is and will increasingly become a highly technical sector with exponential growth, the need to update all documentation has been promoted by a large group of companies in the sector, which, above all, have focused their concerns on the cybersecurity of the industrial robotics world.
Knowing the resources available when performing tasks of hardening a system, will allow us to optimize the time necessary to obtain a safer system. In addition, we have the possibility of using tools capable of auditing the system that identifies those configurations that are considered safe and which ones we could implement.
The programming of PLCs is a fundamental part of the initial phases when building and designing industrial plants. About that environment, the company will base all its operations in that environment making the configuration of these controllers a critical element. When it comes to programming these devices there are a series of steps and best practices that take advantage of the native functionalities available and that involve little or no need to resort to a PLC programmer, protecting the device in a simple way with minimum spend on resource.
This post presents some lines of action that should be followed to deal with a DrDoS cyberattack based on the ARD protocol, describing in detail the prevention, identification and response phases to follow.
This post presents some lines of action that should be followed to deal with a DrDoS cyberattack based on the SNMP protocol, describing in detail the prevention, identification and response phases to follow.
Monitoring and analyzing security incidents in Industrial Control Systems (ICS) has been a priority for many organizations for a while now. As a response to this need, and given the great success in other areas specialized in cybersecurity, the MITRE organization has developed a matrix that collects many of the tactics, techniques and procedures detected in the industrial world. This article seeks to make the contents and potential uses of said matrix known.
It is necessary to protect the main business processes through a set of tasks that allow the organisation to recover from a major incident in a timeframe that does not compromise the continuity of its services. This ensures a planned response to any security breach.
Today, it is common to find SIEM deployed in the IT infrastructures of all kinds of organisations, to be able to monitor and analyse security alerts in applications, systems, network devices, etc. However, though time and resources are being invested in industrial environments, it is still unresolved.
The honeypots, the recommended requirements for their correct implementation, the different possible types and their evolution until today, where they are implemented forming a honeynet.