Vulnerabilities

The WooCommerce - Social Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to and including 2.8.7. This is due to the plugin's Apple login handler accepting the Apple id_token and decoding only its base64 payload without verifying the JWT signature against Apple's public keys or validating the issuer, audience, or expiry claims, combined with the security nonce required to invoke the login flow being publicly exposed to unauthenticated users via a localized JavaScript object on the login page. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing WordPress user — including administrators — by supplying a forged id_token whose payload contains the target user's email address, as that email is used without any role exclusion to resolve a WordPress account and immediately issue an authenticated session for it.

The CubeWP Framework plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.30 via the 'cubewp_get_svg_content' function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information. This is exploitable by unauthenticated attackers because the required nonce is publicly emitted into the markup of any page rendering the CubeWP posts shortcode or widget with AJAX loading enabled, making it harvestable by any guest visitor before submitting the AJAX request.

The User Access Manager plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 2.3.15 via the 'uamgetfile' parameter parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information. This is possible because when attachment_url_to_postid() returns 0 for a traversal path, the plugin falls back to the global post set by a valid ?attachment_id parameter supplied by the attacker, causing the access check to pass against a legitimate public attachment while the file streamed is the attacker-chosen path.

Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.

Authentication bypass using an alternate path or channel vulnerability in N-able N-central allows Authentication Bypass.<br /> <br /> This issue affects N-central: through 2026.1.

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ueberauth guardian allows denial of service via unbounded atom creation from attacker-controlled binary input.<br /> <br /> Guardian.Permissions.AtomEncoding encodes permission scopes by passing arbitrary binaries to String.to_atom/1. When encode/3 in lib/guardian/permissions/atom_encoding.ex is called with a list, each binary entry is handled by the encode_value/3 binary clause, which calls String.to_atom(value) with no allow-list check. The perm_set argument (the application&amp;#39;s small, finite set of legitimate permission names) is discarded, so any external string flows straight into atom creation. This encoder is selected with use Guardian.Permissions, encoding: Guardian.Permissions.AtomEncoding and reached through the imported encode/3 entry point.<br /> <br /> String.to_atom/1 creates a brand-new atom for every previously unseen binary, atoms are never garbage collected, and the BEAM atom table is fixed at roughly 1,048,576 entries by default. An application that funnels attacker-influenced permission scopes (from a request body, a JWT claim, or other external input) into encode/3 therefore mints one permanent atom per distinct value. A modest stream of varied, unauthenticated input permanently consumes the atom table and crashes the BEAM node with system_limit, taking down every application running on it.<br /> <br /> The default encoder is Guardian.Permissions.BitwiseEncoding, which is not affected.<br /> <br /> This issue affects guardian: from 2.0.0 before 2.4.1.

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ueberauth guardian (Guardian.Permissions module) allows a denial of service via BEAM atom-table exhaustion.<br /> <br /> This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/guardian/permissions.ex and program routines &amp;#39;Elixir.Guardian.Permissions&amp;#39;:encode_permissions!/1, &amp;#39;Elixir.Guardian.Permissions&amp;#39;:encode_permissions_into_claims!/2, &amp;#39;Elixir.Guardian.Permissions&amp;#39;:do_encode_permissions!/2.<br /> <br /> The Guardian.Permissions mixin installs a public encode_permissions!/1 function on every module that does use Guardian.Permissions. For each key of the supplied map, encode_permissions!/1 calls String.to_atom(to_string(k)) before any validation runs. The integer-value clause of do_encode_permissions!/2 then short-circuits straight to encoding without validating the key against the configured permission set, so a key with an integer value is interned as a fresh atom with no exception raised. Atoms are never garbage collected and the BEAM atom table is a fixed-size resource (default roughly 1,048,576 entries), so each unique attacker-chosen key permanently consumes one slot. An attacker who can influence a permission map that reaches encode_permissions!/1 (for example a permissions map read from a request body and passed into token issuance via encode_permissions_into_claims!/2) can mint an unbounded number of atoms and exhaust the atom table, crashing the entire BEAM node and every service running on it. The sibling decode_permissions/1 is not affected because it skips keys absent from the configured permission set.<br /> <br /> This issue affects guardian: from 2.0.0 before 2.4.1.

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in ueberauth guardian allows an unauthenticated attacker to revoke a victim&amp;#39;s session with a forged token.<br /> <br /> Guardian.revoke/3 in lib/guardian.ex decodes the supplied token with peek/1, which performs no signature verification (it only base64-decodes the JWT header and payload). The resulting unverified claims are forwarded directly to the configured token module&amp;#39;s revoke callback and the implementation&amp;#39;s on_revoke callback, a state-mutating sink. The sibling operations refresh/2 and exchange/4 both call decode_and_verify first, so the signature is checked before anything acts on the claims; revoke/3 is the only state-mutating path that acts on claims without verifying the signature.<br /> <br /> An attacker who knows or guesses a victim&amp;#39;s identifying claim values (jti, sub) can forge a JWT carrying those claims, sign it with an arbitrary key, and submit it to any endpoint that funnels a caller-supplied token into Guardian.revoke/3 (the standard logout / session-revocation pattern). When the token module mutates state keyed by the claims (whitelist deletion or blacklist insertion, for example a GuardianDb-style store), the victim&amp;#39;s legitimate session is evicted. This is an unauthenticated session-revocation denial of service; the attacker never needs the signing secret.<br /> <br /> This issue affects guardian: from 1.0.0 before 2.4.1.

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ueberauth guardian allows denial of service via unbounded atom creation from attacker-influenced binary input.<br /> <br /> Guardian.Plug.Keys derives connection and session namespace keys by passing arbitrary binaries to String.to_atom/1. base_key/1 in lib/guardian/plug/keys.ex converts any binary into the atom :"guardian_", and the derived helpers claims_key/1, resource_key/1, and token_key/1 create a second atom on top of that. key_from_other/1 likewise converts a regex-captured binary through String.to_atom/1. The public specs advertise String.t() as a valid argument, so passing a string is documented usage, and higher-level entry points such as Guardian.Plug.current_token(conn, key: key) thread the caller-supplied key straight into these functions.<br /> <br /> String.to_atom/1 creates a brand-new atom for every previously unseen binary, atoms are never garbage collected, and the BEAM atom table is fixed at roughly 1,048,576 entries by default. An application that routes attacker-influenced data (a tenant identifier, header, or other request input) into a Guardian key therefore mints one permanent atom per distinct value. A modest stream of varied, unauthenticated input permanently consumes the atom table and crashes the BEAM node, taking down every application running on it.<br /> <br /> This issue affects guardian: from 0.1.0 before 2.4.1.

guzzlehttp/guzzle versions before 7.15.1 contain a denial of service vulnerability in the CookieJar that accepts unlimited Set-Cookie header fields with no size restrictions. Attackers can return many large cookies from a malicious server, causing Guzzle to store excessive data in memory and generate oversized Cookie headers that fail in handlers or destination servers.

guzzlehttp/guzzle versions before 7.15.1 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in RedirectMiddleware. When the optional allow_redirects.referer setting is enabled, the middleware copies the URI fragment (the portion after &amp;#39;#&amp;#39;) from the referring request into the generated Referer header when following a same-scheme redirect (e.g., HTTPS to HTTPS). An attacker who controls the redirect destination can read this fragment from the incoming Referer header, potentially disclosing one-time login secrets, access tokens, state values, or other sensitive client data to a server never meant to receive it. The referer setting is disabled by default. Fixed in 7.15.1, which strips the fragment before generating the Referer value.

guzzlehttp/guzzle versions before 7.15.1 fail to preserve host-only cookie scope, storing the request host in the Domain field instead of marking cookies as host-only. Attackers controlling child hosts can receive host-only cookies intended only for parent hosts, potentially disclosing session identifiers and authorization tokens when the same cookie jar is reused across trust boundaries.