This post will analyse the vulnerabilities associated with Log4Shell, detected in the library Log4j, which is found in infinite software products both in technical and industrial fields. Although there have been other instances of more sophisticated vulnerabilities, the problem with this one is area of exposure.
In previous articles an introduction was given to the 61850 regulation and the different protocols of which it consists. As explained in those articles, the GOOSE and SV (Sample Values) protocols, included in the standard, use multicast frames. Security is very difficult to implement in this type of frame, but there are a number of measures that make possible to raise the security level.
In recent years we have witnessed the evolution of the electrical grid and the development of new technologies produce what we know today as the smart grid. This evolution continues to this day and the trend seems to point to greater interconnection between end consumers and the grid, which increases possible attack vectors. Over the course of this article, we shall see the security measures that will be used in the electrical grid of the future.
Software Defined Radio (SDR) is the result of the technological evolution of conventional analogue radio. Its characteristics and operational capability make it a versatile device with both positive and negative applications within the field of cybersecurity.
Wireless communications encompass a set of protocols that are widely used in some industrial sectors. In particular, building automation is based on these protocols, mainly using the BACNET and Lontalks protocols, but also making use of new ZigBee and Bluetooth based devices for IIoT. This article will provide information on SweynTooth, a set of vulnerabilities that affect Bluetooth technology.
Around 4 million robots are expected to be introduced in the area of industry over the next five years. This is on top of the evolution towards industry 4.0, in which industrial robotics is crucial, and which is now consolidated in any industrial process, from the manufacturing industry to any large-area warehouse. In that industrial transformation, barriers must be applied to ensure the integrity of the components and to prevent incidents in plants.
After the articles “IEC 61850 Standard, all for one and one for all” and “Multicast security in IEC 61850”, it is useful to add more information about the cybersecurity guidelines set out in the IEC 62351 standard with respect to the GOOSE protocol. An explanation will be made of the operation of the protocol, the weaknesses it presents and the appropriate security measures to protect it against possible attackers.
Time synchronization in industrial devices is a critical factor. In terms of time, industrial processes and the programming logic of industrial devices have specific needs. These may require specific accuracy that determines the need to use one protocol or another, as well as dependencies on cost or on the network infrastructure itself. Explaining the main differences is key when using one or another in industrial infrastructures. Just as each protocol has different nuances, there are certain differences to be taken into account within security.
Over the last few years we have seen how electric vehicles have experienced a boom in terms of their development and retail and, along with them, the deployment of their charging points. In this article we will discuss a series of requirements, in terms of security, that should be implemented in these charging stations in order to ensure their security.
Electric charging stations are increasingly used in urban furniture in cities. Electric cars and their need to be charged are a reality. Because of this, there is an increase in supply points that depend on specific protocols and communications for these stations.